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Comm-tents
ENTRAPMENT: A CRITICAL DISCUSSION
I. INTRODUCTION
When officers or agents of the government induce a person into en-
gaging in unlawful conduct for purposes of prosecution, the defendant may
be able to avoid criminal liability by raising the defense of entrapment.1
This defense is premised on the belief that in some circumstances even
the most law-abiding citizen might engage in criminal conduct; thus,
prosecution for a crime induced by police activity is unfair. While some
writers have argued that entrapped defendants should not be allowed to
avoid conviction,2 almost all American jurisdictions recognize the defense.3
Moreover, other writers have contended that the defense of entrapment is
constitutionally based.4 At present, entrapment is a frequently raised
criminal defense, especially in prosecutions for narcotics offenses. The
increased sophistication of law enforcement techniques should provide an
added impetus for utilization of the defense. This comment focuses on the
problems of substantive delineation and procedural fairness that confront
defendants who attempt to defend on entrapment grounds. These issues are
discussed within the context of the Missouri and federal courts. An ex-
haustive discussion of questions of constitutional compulsion vel non is
beyond the scope of this comment. Further, no attempt has been made to
isolate the best theoretical basis for the defense, although the two leading
rationales are identified. Rather, the profile of the defense is examined,
and solutions are offered for some of its attendant problems.
II. THE Ror.. OF THE UNrrED STATES SUPREME COURT
In two important entrapment cases, 5 Sorrells v. United States6 and
Sherman v. United States,' the United States Supreme Court laid the pres-
ent contours of the defense. In Sorrells a prohibition agent went to defend-
ant's home accompanied by three local residents. These residents, who were
well acquainted with defendant, introduced the agent as a tourist from a
nearby city. The agent, defendant and one of the accompanying local resi-
dents discovered that they had been members of the same military unit dur-
ing World War I. In the ensuing conversation about their war experiences,
1. See Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 372 (1958).
2. E.g., De Feo, Entrapment as a Defense to Criminal Responsibility: Its
History, Theory and Application, 1 U. SAN FRAN. L. REv. 243 (1967).
3. Tennessee is possibly the only exception. However, it has been argued
that the Tennessee decisions can be read as adopting the defense of entrapment
when joined with the defense of consent. WORKING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON REFORm OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAws 312-13 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as WORKING PAPERS].
4. E.g., Comment, Due Process of Law and the Entrapment Defense, 1964
U. ILL. L. FORUM 821.
5. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
6. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
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the agent repeatedly asked the defendant if he could acquire liquor for
the agent to take to a business associate. After several denials that he dealt
in liquor or knew where to obtain it, defendant relented and obtained a
jug of whiskey, which he sold to the agent. In the resulting prosecution
for violation of the prohibition laws, the trial court ruled that no entrap-
ment existed as a matter of law. Thus, the court refused to submit this
issue to the jury.8 In holding this ruling to be error,9 the Supreme Court
distinguished between permissible strategy and unlawful entrapment:
The fact that officers or employees of the Government merely
afforded opportunities or facilities for the commission of the of-
fense does not defeat the prosecution. Artifice and stratagem may
be employed to catch those engaged in criminal enterprises. The
appropriate object of this permitted activity . . is to reveal the
criminal design ... and thus to disclose the would-be violators of
the law. A different question is presented when the criminal design
originates with the officials of the Government, and they implant
in the mind of an innocent person the disposition to commit the
alleged offense and induce its commission in order that they may
prosecute.'o
The Court based its decision on the theory that Congress did not intend
"that [the statute's] processes of detection and enforcement should be
abused by the instigation by government officials of an act on the part of
persons otherwise innocent in order to lure them to its commission and to
punish them."" The Court in Sherman agreed with this reasoning, saying,
"Congress could not have intended that its statutes were to be enforced
by tempting innocent persons into violations."' 2
In these two cases the Court adopted what is commonly referred to as
the "origin of intent"'13 or "subjective" test for entrapment. The inquiry
8. 287 U.S. at 438.
9. Id. at 452.
10. Id. at 441-42 (citations omitted).
11. Id. at 448.
12. 356 U.S. at 372. The facts in Sherman reveal inducement activity over
an extended period:
Kalchinian, a government informer, first met petitioner at a doctor's
office where apparently both were being treated to be cured of narcotics
addiction. Several accidental meetings followed, either at the doctor's
office or at the pharmacy where both filled their prescriptions from the
doctor. From mere greetings, conversation progressed to a discussion of
mutual experiences and problems, including their attempts to overcome
addiction to narcotics. Finally Kalchinian asked petitioner if he knew of
a good source of narcotics. He asked petitioner to supply him with a source
because he was not responding to treatment. From the first, petitioner
tried to avoid the issue. Not until after a number of repetitions of the
request, predicated on Kalchinian's presumed suffering, did petitioner
finally acquiesce. Several times thereafter he obtained a quantity of
narcotics which he shared with Kalchinian. . . .After several such sales
Kalchinian informed agents of the Bureau of Narcotics that he had another
seller for them.
Id. at 371. The court reversed Sherman's conviction, finding entrapment as a
matter of law from the undisputed facts as given above. Id. at 373.
13. Note, Entrapment, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1333, 1335 (1960). This test has
been adopted in most jurisdictions. See generally 21 AM. JuR. 2d Criminal Law §§
[Vol. 37
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under the subjective test goes beyond the fact that "the particular act was
committed at the instance of government officials."' 4 When the defendant
introduces evidence of inducement'15 and contends that "the Government
is seeking to punish for an alleged offense which is the product of the
creative activity of its own officials,"'16 the inquiry turns to "the pre-
disposition and criminal design of the defendant."' 7 This approach is
based on the rationale that a defendant who raises this defense "cannot
complain of an appropriate and searching inquiry into his own conduct
and predisposition as bearing on that issue."' 8 Thus, under the subjective
test the ultimate question is whether the inducement by the officers or
the defendant's own predisposition caused the criminal conduct.
The concurring opinions of Justice Roberts in Sorrells'9 and Justice
Frankfurter in Sherman20 disagreed with the respective majorities as to
the proper rationale for the entrapment defense. Justice Roberts argued
that the defense was based on public policy, rather than on principles of
statutory construction; the court should preserve "the purity of its own
temple" from "such prostitution of the criminal law."2 ' Frankfurter agreed
in Sherman,2 2 calling it "sheer fiction"2 3 to base the defense on statutory
construction. He contended that the true basis of the defense was that in
some circumstances "the methods employed on behalf of the Government
to bring about conviction cannot be countenanced .... Public confidence
in the fair and honorable administration of justice ... is the transcending
value at stake." 24
Of more importance, the concurring justices argued that the respective
majorities had applied the wrong test for the defense. Justices Roberts and
Frankfurter urged the adoption of an "objective test, whereby the court
considers only the nature of the police activity involved, without reference
to the predisposition of the particular defendant." 25 Thus, the concurring
143-45 (1965); 22 c.J.S. Criminal Law § 45 (1961); Annots., 77 A.L.R.2d 792
(1961), 75 A.L.R.2d 709 (1960), 69 A.L.R.2d 1397 (1960), 53 A.L.R.2d 1156 (1957),
52 A.L.R.2d 1194 (1957), 33 A.L.R.2d 883 (1954), 31 A.L.R.2d 1212 (1953).
14. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
15. Whiting v. United States, 321 F.2d 72, 76 (1st Cir. 1963).
16. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
17. Id. This is the causation issue. If the defendant was not "predisposed"
but was an "otherwise unwilling person" the defense of entrapment will lie,
assuming a finding that the officers engaged in undue inducement. Sherman v.
United States, 356 U.S. 369, 371 (1958).
18. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
19. Id. at 453 (concurring opinion).
20. 356 U.S. at 378 (concurring opinion).
21. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 457 (1932) (concurring opinion).
22. 356 U.S. at 378 (concurring opinion).
23. Id. at 379.
24. Id. at 380.
25. Note, Entrapment, 73 HARy. L. REv. 1333, 1335 (1960). Roberts con-
tended that the "applicable principle" precluded courts from hearing charges
brought against a defendant who acted upon government instigation. Therefore,
"no comparison of equitie s between the guilty official and the guilty defendant,
has any place in the enforcement of this overruling principle of public policy."Sorrells v. United Stat s, 287 U.S. 435, 459 (1932) (concurring opinion). Frank-
furter wrote: "It is as objective a test as the subject matter permits." Sherman v.
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opinion in Sherman contended that the proper consideration should be
whether the police conduct "falls below standards, to which common
feelings respond, for the proper use of governmental power."2 6 Inquiry
into the criminal predisposition of the defendant, the origin of the intent
to commit the crime and whether "creative activity" by the police caused
the unlawful act are irrelevant under this formulation. Further, evidence
of predisposition (which may include evidence of any past criminal activi-
ties of the type charged) may be unduly prejudicial. Finally, any test that
focuses on the defendant's predisposition tends to ignore the underlying
reason for the defense, police conduct.27
In Sherman Justice Frankfurter proposed a test with an appreciably
different emphasis than the standard adopted by the majority: 28
This does not mean that the police may not act so as to detect
those engaged in criminal conduct and ready and willing to com-
mit further crimes should the occasion arise.... It does mean that
in holding out inducements they should act in such a manner as is
likely to induce to the commission of crime only these persons and
not others who would normally avoid crime and through self-
struggle resist ordinary temptations.29
26. 356 U.S. at 382 (concurring opinion).
27. Id.
28. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
29. 356 U.S. at 383-84 (concurring opinion). This test has been adopted by
the American Law Institute, MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (Proposed Official Draft,
1962); the National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, PRoPosED
NEW FED. CRIM. CODE § 702 (1971); and the criminal code revision projects of
California, CAL. PENAL CODE REVIsiON PRoJEcT § 550 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1967);
Michigan, MICH. REv. CRIM. CODE § 640 (Final Draft, 1967); and Pennsylvania,
PROPOSED CRIM. CODE FoR PA. § 213 (1967). Alaska has adopted the objective test
by case law. Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226 (Alas. 1969). The MODEL PENAL
CODE, supra § 2.13 reads:
(I) A public law enforcement official or a person acting in cooperation
with such an official perpetrates an entrapment if for the purpose of
obtaining evidence of the commission of an offense, he induces or en-
courages another person to engage in conduct constituting such offense
by either:
(a) making knowingly false representations designed to induce the
belief that such conduct is not prohibited; or(b) employing methods of persuasion or inducement which create a
substantial risk that such an offense will be committed by persons
other than those who are ready to commit it.
(2) Except as provided in Subsection (3) of this Section, a person
prosecuted for an offense shall be acquitted if he proves by a preponder-
ance of evidence that his conduct occurred in response to an entrap-
ment. The issue of entrapment shall be tried by the Court in the ab-
sence of the jury.
(3) The defense afforded by this Section is unavailable when causing or
threatening bodily injury is an element of the offense charged and the
prosecution is based on conduct causing or threatening such injury to
a person other than the person perpetrating the entrapment.
The PROPOSED NEW FED. CRIM. CODE, supra § 702 reads:
(1) Affirmative Defense. It is an affirmative defense that the defendant
was entrapped into committing the offense.
(2) Entrapment Defined. Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement
agent induces the commission of an offense, using persuasion or other
[Vol. 37
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Thus, the Frankfurter test emphasized the conduct of the police, rather
than the criminal predisposition of a particular defendant. One writer has
argued that the reasoning behind both tests ultimately is reduced to a
judgment that an entrapped defendant is less guilty than other defend-
ants.30 However, others have taken the opposite position. The latter
writers contend that deterrence of wrongful conduct, not the innocence of
the defendant, provides the justification for the defense.3 1
III. DEVELOPMENT IN MISSOURI
Recognition of a defense based on police overreaching was not a
sudden step for the Missouri courts.32 In 1902 the St. Louis Court of Ap-
peals in State v. Lucas33 refused to acknowledge the existence of such a de.
fense. The court stated that no recognized public policy condemned of-
ficial action designed to entice persons into committing crime. Rather,
such deception rendered a valuable service to the community "when nothing
more than the truth [was] elicited and the guilty [were] brought to
justice."34
In 1910 strong dicta by the Missouri Supreme Court in State v. Lee3 5
indicated that the state's public policy might be other than that declared
in Lucas. In Lee a detective gave money to his employee, Hutchison, with
which to initiate a crap game in defendant's establishment. Hutchison
entered the establishment expecting a raid in one-half hour but found a
game already in progress. In the resulting prosecution, the defendant sought
to rely on State v. Waghalter,3 6 which held that although the owner only
consented to the taking of his goods in order to entrap an intending thief,
such consent was sufficient to prevent the taking from constituting lar-
ceny.3 7 In Lee the court noted that the Waghalter decision would have
controlled if the crap game had been initiated at Hutchison's request.
However, because the game was already underway when the entrapper
entered, "it [could not] be said ... that but for the incitement of Hutchi-
son the defendant might have repented .... "3 8
means likely to cause normally law-abiding persons to commit the offense.
Conduct merely affording a person an opportunity to commit an offense
does not constitute entrapment.
(3) Law Enforcement Agent Defined. In this section "law enforcement
agent" includes personnel of state and local law enforcement agencies as
well as of the United States, and any person cooperating ith such an
agency.
30. Note, Entrapment, 73 HARv. L. Rnv. 1333, 1333-84 (1960).
31. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
32. Missouri has recognized the defense of entrapment since the late 1920's.
See, e.g., State v. Hammond, 447 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. 1969); State v. Taylor, 375
S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1964); State v. Hicks, 326 Mo. 1056, 38 S.W.2d 923 (1930); State
v. Decker, 326 Mo. 946, 33 S.W.2d 958 (1930); State v. Decker, 321 Mo. 1163,
14 S.W.2d 617 (1929).
33. 94 Mo. App. 117, 67 S.W. 971 (St. L. Ct. App. 1902).
34. Id. at 121, 67 S.W. at 972.
35. 228 Mo. 480, 128 S.V. 987 (1910), overruled on other grounds, State v.
Wade, 267 Mo. 249, 183 S.W. 598 (1916).
36. 177 Mo. 676, 76 S.W. 1028 (1903).
37. State v. Lee, 228 Mo. 480, 500, 128 S.W. 987, 993 (1910).




Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1972
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
Nevertheless, in 1915 the Springfield Court of Appeals in State v.
Richie3 9 espoused a position similar to that taken in Lucas. Richie in-
volved a prosecution for selling whiskey in violation of a local option law.
Although a deputy sheriff made the purchase in question, the trial court
refused to instruct on any defense similar to entrapment. In affirming the
conviction, the appellate court ignored the Lee dicta, but stated: "That
the purchaser is an officer is immaterial in law and commendable in morals,
where done to detect and supress crime."4 0
However, in 1916 the St. Louis Court of Appeals decided State v. Ebel,41
the first Missouri case holding available a defense based on police over-
reaching. Under Missouri law at the time the facts in Ebel occurred, cer-
tain private clubs could sell liquor to members without possessing a liquor
license. In this case a police officer entered a club that employed defendant
as a doorkeeper. Because the officer falsely represented that he was a
member, defendant sold him certain liquor tickets. The officer exchanged
these tickets for drinks at the bar. The appellate court overturned defend-
ant's resulting conviction for selling liquor without a license. 42 Although
the opinion criticized the Lucas holding, the court distinguished the facts
in that case from those in the case at bar. In Lucas official action enticed
the defendant into committing the offense. However, in Ebel the police
deception caused the defendant to believe that the circumstances, if true,
were such that the conduct in question was innocent. 43
By the late 1920's the defense of entrapment in Missouri had roughly
assumed its present form.44 Today Missouri follows a subjective test for
39. 180 S.W. 2 (Spr. Mo. App. 1915).
40. Id. at 3.
41. 188 S.W. 1132 (St. L. Mo. App. 1916).
42. Id, at 1134.
43. Id. As the court correctly pointed out, this case did not involve the
question of inducement. The facts in Ebel were similar to those in Voves v.
United States, 249 F. 191 (7th Cir. 1918), where the defendant was prosecuted
under a statute prohibiting the sale of liquor to Indians. The government had
disguised an Indian to look like a Mexican, to whom sales of liquor were allowed.
The court reversed the conviction, saying that public policy estopped the gov-
ernment from prosecuting for an act originating in and caused by a government
agent's deception. Id. at 192. See United States v. Healy, 202 F. 349, 350 (D. Mont.
1913), where on facts almost identical to those in Voves the court said that the
government was estopped from prosecuting because of its "fraudulent conceal-
ment and deceit."
WORKING PAPRERS, supra note 3, at 310-11, cite the Healy situation as an ex-
ample of a "frame-up." Although not precisely the same, the "frame-up" is
analogous to the entrapment situation. However, the Working Papers state that
"the proposed entrapment statute is drafted broadly enough to encompass
["frame-up"] situations ..... Id. at 312. The Model Penal Code explicitly covers
this situation. The section on entrapment includes cases where a law enforce-
ment official or someone cooperating with him induces or encourages another to
engage in conduct for the purpose of prosecution by "making knowingly false
representations designed to induce the belief that such conduct is not pro-
hibited." MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (1) (a) (Proposed Official Draft. 1962).
44. In 1928 the Missouri Supreme Court wrote as dicta:
The distinctions seem to be well defined. If a person is induced by any-
one to commit a crime for the purpose of securing a conviction, the con-
viction will not stand. But if the purpose to commit the crime is in the
mind of the defendant at the time, or suggested by him, the defense of
[Vol. 37
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entrapment 45 resembling that adopted by the Sorrells and Sherman ma-
jorities. Although the Missouri courts have not completely discussed either
opinion, they have cited these two cases as stating the general rule of law.4 6
Further, both the Missouri courts and the United States Supreme Court
have relied, in part, on the same leading case in the entrapment area. The
majority in Sorrells cited Butts v. United States4 7 as the leading case rec-
ognizing the defense in the lower federal courts. 48 In an important 1929
case, State v. Decker,49 the Missouri Supreme Court also relied on Butts.
In Decker a conviction for violation of the prohibition laws was reversed
because the trial court failed to instruct on entrapment. The court stated:
The rules applicable may be stated thus: Where the criminal
intent originates in the mind of the defendant on trial, and the
offense is accomplished, it constitutes no defense that an oppor-
tunity is furnished, or that an officer aids in the commission of the
crime, in order to obtain evidence upon which to prosecute him.
But where the criminal intent originates in the mind of the en-
trapper, and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense
charged, in order to prosecute him therefor, it is the general rule
that no conviction may be had, though the criminality of the act
is not affected by any question of consent.50
Additional support for this proposition can be found in State v. Ham-
mond,51 where the Missouri Supreme Court held that a jury instruction
correctly stated the law on entrapment.52 The court in Hammond pointed
entrapment will not avail. Officers or other persons may make an op-
portunity for one to commit a crime for the purpose of securing a con-
viction, and a conviction so obtained will be upheld if the criminal in-
tent originated in the mind of the accused.
State v. Murphy, 320 Mo. 219, 227, 6 S.W.2d 877, 880 (1928), relying principally
on Ritter v. United States, 293 F. 187 (9th Cir. 1923).
45. See text accompanying notes 13-18 supra.
46. See, e.g., State v. Van Regenmorter, 465 S.W.2d 613 (Mo. 1971); State
v. Napolis, 436 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. 1969); State v. Taylor, 375 S.W.2d 58 (Mo.
1964); Kansas City v. Martin, 369 S.W.2d 602 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963).
47. 273 F. 35 (8th Cir. 1921). In this case the United States Court of Appeals
for the Eighth Circuit reversed a narcotics conviction because the trial court had
not instructed on entrapment.
48. 287 U.S. at 444.
49. 321 Mo. 1163, 14 S.W.2d 617 (1929).
50. Id. at 1169, 14 S.W.2d at 619-20, citing Butts v. United States, 273 F. 35
(8th Cir. 1921). Other Missouri cases have also cited Butts as authority. E.g.,
State v. Hicks, 326 Mo. 1056, 33 S.W.2d 923 (1930); State v. Decker, 326 Mo.
946, 33 S.W.2d 958 (1930).
51. 447 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. 1969).
52. Id. at 254-55. The instruction read:
The defendant offers the defense of unlawful entrapment as to the
crime charged in the information.
The law recognizes two kinds of entrapment: unlawful entrapment
and lawful entrapment. Where a person has no previous intent to violate
the law, but is induced or persuaded by law enforcement officers to com-
mit a crime, he is entitled to the defense of unlawful entrapment, because
the law as a matter of policy forbids a conviction in such a case.
On the other hand, where a person already has the readiness and
willingness to break the law, the mere fact that Government agents pro-
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out that the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit had
approved a similar instruction 53 in Cross v. United States.54 Of course, the
Cross instruction followed the subjective test set out in Sorrells and
Sherman.
In the spring of 1971, the Board of Governors of the Missouri Bar
recommended5 5 that the Missouri Supreme Court approve for use the
Draft Missouri Pattern Criminal Instructions, prepared by a special com-
mittee of the bar. The proposed instructions concerning entrapment follow
the subjective test.56 Whether the court will approve these instructions is
lawful entrapment. When, for example, the Government has reasonable
grounds for believing that a person is engaged in the illicit sale of nar-
cotics, it is not unlawful entrapment for a Government agent to pre-
tend to be someone else and to offer, either directly or through an in-
former or other decoy, to purchase narcotics from such suspected person.
If, then, the jury should find beyond a reasonable doubt from the
evidence in the case that, before anything at all occurred respecting the
alleged offense involved in this case, the defendant was ready and willing
to commit crimes such as charged in the Information, whenever oppor-
tunity was offered, and that the Government agents did no more than
offer the opportunity, the defendant is not entitled to the defense of un-
lawful entrapment. [The preceding paragraph will hereinafter be referred
to as Part One.]
On the other hand, if the jury should find from the evidence in the
case that the defendant had no previous intent or purpose to commit
any offense of the character here charged, and did so only because he was
induced or persuaded by some agent of the Government, then the defense
of unlawful entrapment is a good defense, and the jury should acquit the
defendant. [The preceding paragraph will hereinafter be referred to
as Part Two.]
The court in Hammond did not thoroughly discuss this instruction. However, the
court did point out that the ultimate source of the instruction was W. C. MATHES& E. J. DEvrrr, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INsTRUCTIONS § 10.12 (1965), an un-
official work. The Missouri court apparently adopted the instruction on the
assumption that it squarely agreed with existing law. See text accompanying notes
99-104 infra, for a discussion that questions this assumption.
53. Id. at 255.
54. 347 F.2d 327, 332 (8th Cir. 1965).
55. 27 J. Mo. B. 531 (1971).
56. DRArT Mo. PATrERN C~an. INsTR. Nos. 3.28 & 3.30 (1969). These in-
structions read:
No. 3.28 (recommended):
Even if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant engaged in the conduct submitted in Instruction
No.-, nevertheless you are instructed that unless you also find
and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt:
First, that the defendant was ready and willing to engage in the
conduct, and
Second, that the officer(s) only provided the defendant with the op-
portunity to engage in the conduct,
you must find the defendant not guilty....
No. 3.30 (only if requested by defendant):
Even if you find and believe from the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant engaged in the conduct submitted in Instruc-
tion No. , nevertheless if you further find and believe from the
evidence:
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unknown. However, the court has indicated that consideration probably
will be on a case by case basis.5'7 Thus, some time may elapse before the
proposed entrapment instruction is considered. Approval of this instruction
would have little impact on present Missouri law. However, the Committee
for a Modem Criminal Code, which is currently preparing a compre-
hensive revision of Missouri's criminal law, has an opportunity to alter
the development of the state's law in the entrapment area.58
The development of entrapment as a defense in Missouri includes one
notable idiosyncrasy. Based on "origin of intent" language of the subjective
test, the Missouri courts have held, at times, that entrapment offers no
defense to a liquor offense prosecution. 59 Because liquor offenses do not
require mens rea, these courts reason that the origin of the "intent" to
commit the crime is irrelevant. 60 The logic of this position is questionable.
Under the subjective test, the crucial inquiry should be whether the de-
fendant would engage in unlawful conduct of the type charged solely on
his own or only in response to undue persuasion.61 If evidence in a case
indicates that the police or their collaborators offered persuasive induce-
ments, the absence of a mens rea element in the crime should not foreclose
the defense. In any event, "origin of intent" inquiry focuses on "a general
intent or predisposition"' 62 rather than on a specific criminal intent.
Adoption of an objective test would eliminate this idiosyncrasy, because
the mental state of the defendant is not pertinent to the inquiry under
such a test.
IV. PARTICIPATION OF A GOVERNMENT AGENT
In order for the defense of entrapment to be available, the induce-
ment to commit the crime must come from a government agent or someone
Second, that the officer(s) induced him to do so, and
Third, that he would not have done so except for such inducement,
then you must acquit the defendant.
57. See State v. Jackson, No. 56574 (Mo., Sept. 25, 1972); State v. Minnis,
No. 55465 (Mo., Sept. 25, 1972); State v. Neal, No. 56625 (Mo., Sept. 11, 1972);
State v. Smart, No. 57293 (Mo., Sept. 11, 1972); State v. Walker, No. 57135(Mo., Sept. 11, 1972); State v. Coleman, 481 S.W.2d 235 (Mo. 1972); State v.
Marston, 479 S.W.2d 481 (Mo. 1972).
58. The Committee for a Modem Criminal Code anticipates completion of a
draft in time for submission to the 1974 General Assembly. This draft will con-
sist of a complete revision of Missouri criminal law. Interview with Gary L.
Anderson, Executive Secretary of the Committee for a Modern Criminal Code,
in Columbia, Missouri, Sept. 20, 1972.
59. See, e.g., State v. Varnon, 174 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. 1943); State v. Sheeler,
320 Mo. 173, 7 S.W.2d 840 (1928); State v. Broaddus, 315 Mo. 1279, 289 S.W. 792(1926), State v. Seidler, 267 S.W. 424 (St. L. Mo. App. 1924). But see State v.
Hicks, 326 Mo. 1056, 33 S.W.2d 923 (1930); State v. Decker, 321 Mo. 1163, 14
S.W.2d 617 (1929). In the latter two cases, the court allowed the defense of en-
trapment in prosecutions for liquor offenses. Further, the court in Seidler pointed
out that the general proscription against use of the defense in this type of
prosecution did not extend to the "frame-up" situation. See note 43 and accom-
panying text supra. Missouri is not the only jurisdiction with cases that refused to
allow the defense of entrapment in a liquor offense prosecution. See generally
ANNOT., 55 A.L.R.2d 1322, 1333-34 (1957).
60. State v. Sheeler, 320 Mo. 173, 178, 7 S.W.2d 340, 341 (1928); State v.
Broaddus, 315 Mo. 1279, 1285, 289 S.W. 792, 795 (1926).
61. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435, 451 (1932).
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working under his direction;6 3 inducement by a private citizen normally
will not satisfy the requirements of the defense.64 Language in some early
Missouri opinions indicates that the defense can be established regardless
of the entrapper's nonofficial status.65 However, because Missouri presently
follows federal law in this area,6 6 the entrapper probably must be an officer
or informer for the defense to be available today at the state level.
The instruction approved as accurately stating Missouri law in State
v. HammondU7 referred to inducement and persuasion "by some agent of
the Government." On the basis of this language, it might be argued that
inducement by a mere informer or special government employee will not
satisfy the requirements of the defense. Nevertheless, as previously stated,
Missouri follows the federal law on entrapment rather closely, and in the
federal courts "special Government employees, as well as regular enforce-
ment officers, are forbidden to engage in unlawful entrapment."6 s For
63. See, e.g., Whiting v. United States, 321 F.2d 72 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 884 (1963) (dicta); Carson v. United States, 310 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1962);
Polski v. United States, 33 F.2d 686 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 280 U.S. 591 (1929).
The PROrosED Nxw FED. CRaM. CODE § 702 (3) (1971) says that entrapment extends
to overreaching by "law enforcement agents":
In this section "law enforcement agent" includes personnel of state and
local law enforcement agencies as well as of the United States, and any
person cooperating with such an agency.
64. Carbajal-Portillo v. United States, 396 F.2d 944 (9th Cir. 1968); Pearson
v. United States, 378 F.2d 555 (5th Cir. 1967); United States v. Laverick, 348
F.2d 708 (3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 940 (1965). MODEL PENzAL CODE § 2.10,
Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959), points out reasons for not recognizing the
defense of entrapment where the alleged entrapper is a private citizen, and in-
stead limiting it to situations where conduct of the police or their associates is
in question:
It is the attempt to deter wrongful conduct on the part of the govern-
ment that provides the justification for the defense of entrapment. . .
The harm done by increasing the risk of offending on the part of the
innocent is great. Some persons will thus turn to crime and risk the pain
of punishment at the call of law enforcement. When officers are engaged
in persuading citizens to criminal acts, they are absent from their proper
task of apprehending those offenders who act without encouragement.
Such tactics spread suspicion in the community and can easily be em-
ployed as the expression of personal malice on the part of a police
officer. Perhaps most important of all is the injury to the reputation of
law enforcement institutons which follows the employment of methods
shocking to the moral standards of the community.
An Oklahoma case, Beasley v. State, 282 P.2d 249 (Oka. Crim. App. 1955), in-
dicates that an instruction on entrapment is required where a private citizen
acting on his own seeks to entrap a defendant but first notifies officers so that
they may lie in wait. But see People v. Gregg, 5 Cal. App. 3d 502, 85 Cal. Rptr.
273 (1970).
65. See, e.g., State v. Murphy, 320 Mo. 219, 227, 6 S.W.2d 877, 880 (1928):
Ifa person is induced by anyone to commit a crime for the purpose of securing
a conviction, the conviction will not stand." (emphasis added).
66. See text accompanying notes 45-54 supra.
67. 447 S.W.2d 253, 254 (Mo. 1969).
68. Carson v. United States, 310 F.2d 558, 561 (9th Cir. 1962); see PROPOSED
Nmw FED. CzrA. CODE § 702 (3) (1971). A Delaware case said: "It is ...necessary
for the person luring an unsuspecting defendant into the commission of a crime
to be connected in some fashion with the active enforcement of the law." Halko
v. State, 209 A.2d 895, 899 (Del. 1965). Halko involved a prosecution for giving
[Vol. 37
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example, in Sherman v. United States,60 where the entrapper was an in-
former named Kalchinian, the Court wrote:
The Government cannot disown Kalchinian and insist it is not
responsible for his actions. Although he was not being paid, Kal-
chinian was an active government informer who had but recently
been the instigator of at least two other prosecutions. Undoubtedly
the impetus for such achievements was the fact that in 1951 Kal-
chinian was himself under criminal charges for illegally selling
narcotics and had not yet been sentenced.70
As one observer pointed out, "the courts have treated... paid informers
and those acting under promises of immunity as government agents."71
Under certain circumstances in Missouri, permitting the state to
withhold the identity of its undercover employee on the ground of privilege,
after the defendant has raised the defense of entrapment, may constitute
prejudicial error. In State v. Davis72 the defendant alleged that he was
inveigled into selling drugs to an agent named Dixon by a man whose
identity the prosecution refused to reveal before trial. Not until the cross-
examination of Dixon at trial did the prosecution disclose the identity of
the alleged entrapper. The court emphasized that the informer "was the
false information on a driver's license application. The defense of entrapment
was held inapplicable, because the alleged entrapper was an examiner for opera-
tor licenses and had no enforcement duties.
69. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
70. Id. at 373-74. A footnote by the Court indicated that in 1952 Kalchinian
received a suspended sentence, after the United States Attorney informed the
District Judge that the entrapper had cooperated with the government. Id. at 374
n.3.
71. Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent
Provocateurs, 60 YALE L.J. 1091, 1109 (1951).
The "contingent fee" type of pay arrangement with informers has troubled
at least one court:
Without some such justification or explanation [i.e., "certain knowdedge"],
we cannot sanction a contingent fee agreement to produce evidence against
particular named defendants as to crimes not yet committed. Such an
arrangement might tend to a "frame up," or to cause an informer to
induce or persuade innocent persons to commit crimes which they had
no previous intent or purpose to commit. The opportunities for abuse
are too obvious to require elaboration.
Williamson v. United States, 311 F.2d 441, 444 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 381
U.S. 950 (1965). The WoRKING PAPERS or THE NATIONAL CommssIoN ON REroIm
oF FEDERAL CpamAL LAws 310 (1970) [hereinafter cited as WORKMG PAPERS],
points out that the manual of instructions for Internal Revenue agents interprets
the "certain knowledge" requirement as being similar to probable cause. How-
ever, in 1964 the same court that decided Williamson, defined "certain knowl-
edge" as the equivalent of "prior knowledge." The court commented that the
accused's record of past convictions for the same offense plus the neighbor's
complaints about his activities satisfied the requirement. Thus, the court upheld
the contingent fee arrangement on the facts of this particular case. Hill v. United
States, 328 F.2d 988 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 851 (1964). In 1965 the
same court again refused to condemn a contingent fee arrangement in a case
involving prosecution of a county sheriff for operating a liquor "protection"
racket. The court emphasized the federal agents' prior knodedge of the defend-
ant's dealings and the difficulty of detecting the criminal activity of a state law
enforcement officer. Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1965).
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only person who could confirm appellants claim of innocence and help
establish his defense of entrapment. a7 3 Further, the two basic reasons for
allowing the privilege (the security of the informer and the preservation of
channels of information to the state) could not have concerned the
prosecutor, who tacitly waived the privilege by consenting to the dis-
closure at trial. Because the record strongly suggested a conscious effort
by the prosecution to suppress evidence favorable to the defense until
too late to be of benefit, the court reversed the conviction.74
As a general rule, if the defendant knew that he was dealing with an
officer, the defense of entrapment will be unavailable. 75 However, an ex-
ception is made in cases of official bribery: "Entrapment may lie where
a government officer demands a bribe, and an otherwise innocent person
who fears official retaliation might yield to such a demand."70
V. INDUCEMENT OR OVERREACHING
Mere presentation of an opportunity to commit crime will not satisfy
the requirements of the defense.77 Entrapment "has no application to a
situation where enforcement officers merely permit a violation to occur
in order to get sufficient facts to insure conviction."7 8 For example, a
simple offer by an officer or agent to buy drugs will not warrant an in-
struction on entrapment.79 In State v. Varnon,80 state agents tried to buy
intoxicating beverages from defendant, who did not have a liquor license.
After being refused, the agent persuaded Creasey, a friend of defendant,
to approach him about purchasing liquor. Upon Creasey's request, the
defendant sold him liquor. In affirming the resulting conviction for selling
73. Id. at 172.
74. Id. at 173. The court added that upon defendant's request, the state had
a duty to make a good faith effort to locate the entrapper and inform the de-
fendant of his whereabouts. Id.
75. See, e.g., Reid v. United States, 334 F.2d 915 (9th Cir. 1964); People v.
Estrada, 211 Cal. App. 2d 722, 27 Cal. Rptr. 605 (1963). In one Missouri case,
the evidence indicated that defendant knew that he was obtaining marijuana for
a plainclothes officer. In discussing the entrapment issue, the Missouri Supreme
Court did not mention the effect this knowledge might have on the availability
of the defense. Neither party's brief raised this point on appeal. See Brief for
Appellant, Brief for Appellee, State v. Stock, 463 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. 1971).
76. Orfield, The Defense of Entrapment in the Federal Courts, 1967 DUKE
L.J. 39, 46 n.47 [hereinafter cited as Orfield], citing United States ex rel. Hassel
v. Mathues, 22 F.2d 979 (E.D. Pa. 1927); Capuano v. United States, 9 F.2d 41
(1st Cir. 1925).
77. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); United States v. DeVore,
423 F.2d 1069 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 950 (1971); State v. Decker,
326 Mo. 946, 33 S.W.2d 958 (1930); State v. Murphy, 320 Mo. 219, 6 S.W.2d 877(1928).
78. Murray v. United States, 250 F.2d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
357 U.S. 932 (1958); see Stein v. United States, 166 F.2d 851 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
334 U.S. 844 (1948).
79. Kibby v. United States, 372 F.2d 598 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 387 U.S.
931 (1967); State v. Napolis, 436 S.W.2d 645 (Mo. 1969). But cf. Kansas City v.
Martin, 369 S.W.2d 602 (K.C. Mo. App. 1963), where a vice squad officer in-
formed a bellhop that he desired to engage the services of a prostitute. When
the prostitute appeared and gave her price, she was arrested and subsequently
prosecuted.
80. 174 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. 1943).
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liquor without a license, the court commented that the trial judge had
properly refused to instruct on entrapment; Creasey's collaboration with
the officers merely "afforded appellant an opportunity to violate the
law."
81
State v. Taylor8 2 may be profitably compared with the above situations.
In that case, a defendant convicted of selling marijuana appealed on
the ground that the trial court erred in failing to instruct on entrapment.
An undercover agent, with no apparent reason for believing defendant
to be a narcotics violator, initiated conversations and visited with defendant
on five occasions within a three or four month period. Each time, the
agent asked defendant to sell him marijuana. Defendant always replied
that he neither had marijuana nor knew anyone who did. On at least
one of these visits, the agent took beer to defendant's home. On the sixth
visit, at a time when defendant was unemployed, the agent repeated his
persistent offer of $5 for each can of marijuana the defendant could secure.
Defendant finally yielded and, after considerable effort, obtained mari-
juana for the agent. In holding that this evidence of entrapment should
have gone to the jury, the court emphasized that the agent did more than
merely present an opportunity:
The jury had a right to find that the government agent initiated
the idea of purchasing the narcotics; that the crime was the "prod-
uct of the creative activity" of [the agent], that the intention to
commit this crime did not originate in the mind of defendant
but was planted there by the agent, who, through misrepresenta-
tion and deceit, imposition, persistent and repeated solicitation,
inducement and promises of money consideration to one in re-
duced financial circumstances, finally engineered defendant's par-
ticipation in criminal activity which but for the pressures applied
would never have been undertaken by him.8 3
It should be noted that Taylor did not hold that the evidence showed
entrapment as a matter of law, but only that an instruction was required.
The Missouri and federal courts have held that numerous types of
action by government officers, agents or informers warrant a jury instruc-
tion on entrapment: Purchasing beer for defendant immediately prior to
commission of the offense;8 4 promising defendant extravagant amounts of
81. Id. at 148. The court also pointed out that entrapment is generally not
available "where the statute prohibits the act of selling intoxicating liquor (as
distinguished from a sale with a specific intent) ..... Id.; see note 59, and
accompanying text supra.
82. 375 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1964).
83. Id. at 61. Compare Peters v. State, 248 Ark. 134, 138, 450 S.W.2d 276,
278 (1970):
Perhaps, neither the persistent solicitation, the use of an alias, the mis-
representation of the purposes for which [the agent] wanted to acquire
the mariquana nor the use of friends of appellant for an entree, stand-
ing alone, would have been sufficient to raise a fact question as to en-
trapment, but when taken together along with the total lack of evidence
that Peters had possessed or sold marijuana before, there was such an
issue.
84. State v. Hammond, 447 S.W.2d 253, 255 (Mo. 1969). But cf. State v.
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money;8 5 feigning illness in order to gain defendant's sympathy;8 6 urging
defendant to commit the crime "for old times' sake";8 7 providing de-
fendant with narcotics to sell.88 Although not entrapment in the classical
sense, some courts have required an instruction on entrapment where
the officers deceived the defendant by causing him to believe that the
conduct in question was not illegal.8 9
VI. PREDIsPosrrION
Under an objective test for entrapment only the nature of the police
activity is considered. However, under the subjective test, the inquiry does
not focus solely upon the conduct of the alleged entrapper; "the accused
will be subjected to an 'appropriate and searching inquiry into his own
conduct and predisposition' .... " 90 Thus, the subjective test distinguishes
"between the trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary
criminal." 91 This language permits the argument that a trap for an "un-
wary criminal" is always permissible, because a finding that the defendant
was predisposed to commit acts similar to those charged will nullify evi-
dence of government inducement. 92 The comments to the Model Penal
Code section on entrapment adhere to the majority view under the sub-
jective formulation: if an informer or agent "makes overreaching appeals
to compassion and friendship and thus moves D to sell narcotics, D has
no defense if he is predisposed to narcotics peddling."93
The Missouri law on this point is unclear; the cases refer to both
"predisposition ' 94 and to a "readiness and willingness to break the law."95
Court said: "The suggestion that the evidence that [the officer] supplied the
appellant with his favorite brand of whiskey would support a finding of undue
inducement is without merit." The trial court's refusal to instruct on entrap-
ment was upheld.
85. Morei v. United States, 127 F.2d 827 (6th Cir. 1942).
86. State v. Hicks, 326 Mo. 1056, 33 S.W.2d 923 (1930).
Defendant's evidence . . . tends to show further that the officers not
only originated the intent, but they schemed to procure defendant to
obtain whiskey by obtaining defendant's confidence and playing upon
his sympathy, in that they drank with him in the role of comrades and
feigned illness and the necessity of whiskey to quiet their nerves.
Id. at 1061-62, 33 S.W.2d at 925.
87. See Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
88. State v. Boccelli, 105 Ariz. 495, 467 P.2d 740 (1970); People v. Strong,
21 Ill. 2d 320, 172 N.E.2d 765 (1961). See also Scott v. Commonwealth, 303 Ky.
353, 197 S.W.2d 774 (1946).
89. See note 43 supra.
90. Sherman v. United Sates, 356 U.S. 369, 373 (1958).
91. Id. at 372.
92. Orfield, supra note 76, at 59 n.122.
93. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). The
WORMNG PArTIs, supra note 71, at 319-20, point out that predisposition of a
defendant gives officers "carte blanche" for their conduct. See State v. Marquardt,
139 Conn. 1, 6-7, 89 A.2d 219, 222 (1950). But see United States v. Klosterman,
248 F.2d 191 (3rd Cir. 1957), where the court found entrapment, although the
evidence indicated that the defendant initiated the overtures directed at bribing
a federal agent. The court emphasized that the agent continued his inducements
after the defendant stated his desire to disassociate himself from these dealings.
Id. at 195.
94. E.g., State v. Taylor, 375 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Mo. 1964).
95. E.g., State v. Hammond, 447 S.W.2d 253, 254 (Mo. 1969).
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Because the essential question under the subjective test is whether the
criminal conduct was the product of creative activity96 by officers or the
defendant's own predisposition, the real issue is causation. The Missouri
Supreme Court phrased the standard as whether officers "engineered de-
fendant's participation in criminal activity which but for the pressures
applied would never have been undertaken by him" 97 Thus, a predisposed
defendant cannot be entrapped, because it cannot be said that such a
defendant engaged in the criminal conduct solely as a result of police
inducement.98 However, the instruction approved by the Missouri Supreme
Court in State v. Hammond99 does not dearly convey this idea. Under Part
One of that instruction, the jury must find both that the defendant was
predisposed and that the government agent did no more than present an
opportunity,10o in order to find the defendant guilty. Thus, the defendant
appears to have an advantage not available under the general rule. Under
Part One a finding of predisposition alone will not neutralize the defense
of entrapment. However, Part Two of the instruction more dearly reflects
the general rule. Under Part Two, the jury is told to acquit if they
find from the evidence in the case that the defendant had no
previous intent or purpose to commit any offense of the character
here charged, and did so only because he was induced or per-
suaded by some agent of the Government. ... 101
If Part Two of the instruction is read in conjunction with Part One,
neither conviction nor acquittal could result in cases where the jury found
both predisposition and police inducement. However, because Part One
requires that predisposition and mere opportunity be found beyond a
reasonable doubt 0 2 in order to warrant conviction, this problem of logic is
less serious than it may appear. Absent such a finding, acquittal would
necessarily result. Thus, a literal application of this instruction dictates
that the jury acquit even a predisposed defendant if they find that the
police activity extended beyond mere presentation of an opportunity; that
result is contrary to the traditional subjective test. Considering the
authorities generally discussed by the Missouri cases, the discussions in
those cases of the impact of a finding of predisposition, and the failure of
the Hammond court to state that its decision altered the law, that result
was probably not intended. Moreover, taken in conjunction, the two parts
of the instruction probably are confusing to a jury. The Draft Missouri
Pattern Criminal Instructions on entrapment resemble the Hammond
instruction and, thus, fail to solve this problem.' 03
By straining the language of the Hammond instruction, one can argue
that Part One does, in fact, cover the situation where both predisposition
96. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 485, 451 (1932).
97. State v. Taylor, 875 S.W.2d 58, 61 (Mo. 1964) (emphasis added).
98. See State v. Stock, 468 S.W.2d 889, 892 (Mo. 1971), quoting Butler v.
United States, 191 F.2d 488, 437 (4th Cir. 1951).
99. 447 S.W.2d 253, 254 (Mo. 1969).
100. See instruction quoted note 52 supra.
101. Id.
102. Id.
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and police inducements are found. If a defendant is predisposed to com-
mit offenses similar to that charged, any persuasion by an officer will
merely constitute presentation of an opportunity. However, this argu-
ment (that opportunity is relative) ignores the fact that in the doctrine
of entrapment "opportunity" has become a term of art that generally
encompasses official activity not reaching the level of inducement. More-
over, even assuming the validity of this argument as an abstract proposi-
tion, a jury instruction that does not mean what it says cannot be justified.
The Hammond instruction could easily be altered to conform with
the general rule under the subjective test, that a finding of predisposition
alone defeats the defense of entrapment. By changing the conjunctive
"and" in Part One to the disjunctive "or," acquittal on entrapment grounds
would be precluded if the jury found either predisposition or mere pre-
sentation of opportunity. Query: whether this change would make the in-
struction easier for the jury to understand?
Problems in drafting entrapment instructions are easier to avoid in
objective test jurisdictions. The objective test only examines whether
police conduct is "likely to induce to the commission of crime ... persons
who would normally avoid crime and through self-struggle resist ordinary
temptations." 04 Because causation is not at issue, the jury is instructed
to consider only the impact of the police conduct on the reasonable man.
Thus, confusing sorties into considerations of predisposition are avoided.
VII. EVIDENCE OF PRIOR CRImINAL Acrzvrrv
In some jurisdictions predisposition can be demonstrated by the de-
fendant's "ready complaisance" with the solicitation of an officer' 0 5 Of
more importance, predisposition may also be shown by evidence of the
defendant's prior similar criminal activity.' 0 6 Although no Missouri case
has discussed the problem, the courts have assumed the admissibility of
such evidence on this issue. For example, in State v. Taylor,0 7 while sum-
marizing the evidence of entrapment produced at trial, the court noted
that the prosecution had failed to show that defendant had previously
handled narcotics "or that he had ever been convicted of any violation
of the narcotics laws. .. ."
The danger to the defendant of undue prejudice at trial resulting
from evidence of prior criminal activity of the type charged is obvious.
104. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383-84 (1958) (concurring
opinion).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Wallace, 269 F.2d 394, 397 (3rd Cir. 1959);
Kivette v. United States, 230 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 935
(1958). This method of showing predisposition has been challenged on due process
grounds. This argument states that police should not be able to justify an arrest
resulting from their own overreaching by pointing out that the defendant re-
sponded to official inducement. Note, The Serpent Beguiled Me and I Did Eat:
The Constitutional Status of the Entrapment Defense, 74 YAmE L.J. 942, 945
(1965).
106. See, e.g., Carson v. United States, 310 F.2d 558 (9th Cir. 1962); Ryles
v. United States, 183 F.2d 944 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 877 (1950); see
Orfield, supra note 76, at 59. But see People v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d 1, 345 P.2d
928 (1959).
107. 375 S.W.2d 58, 60 (Mo. 1964).
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One state supreme court accurately pointed out that admission of such
evidence to show predisposition, in effect, places the defendant on trial
for his past offenses and character. 108 This problem is especially acute
if the question goes to the jury. As Justice Frankfurter pointed out, under
the subjective test "[t]he defendant must either forego the claim of en-
trapment or run the substantial risk that.., the jury will allow a criminal
record or bad reputation to weigh in its determination of guilt of the
specific offense of which he stands charged." 09 Sherman v. United States" O
graphically illustrates the problem. In that case the Court commented that
"a nine-year-old sales conviction and a five-year-old possession conviction
[were] insufficient to prove petitioner had a readiness to sell narcotics
at the time [the informer] approached him.. . .*"1 Yet, the trial court
had submitted the entrapment issue to the jury, which, undoubtedly
prejudiced by the evidence of the prior convictions, returned a verdict of
guilty.112
In an effort to mitigate the danger of undue prejudice under the sub-
jective test, the Model Penal Code argues that "the most urgent consider-
ations" dictate that the issue of entrapment be tried by the court without
a jury."8s This position is based on the rationale that a judge is more
capable than a jury of evaluating the evidence. Thus, the court is less
likely to misuse evidence of the defendant's prior criminal activity."14
As a related problem, officers sometimes employ unfair law enforce-
ment tactics against past offenders. As Justice Frankfurter wrote:
Past crimes do not forever outlaw the criminal and open him to
police practices, aimed at securing his repeated conviction, from
which the ordinary citizen is protected. The whole ameliorative
hopes of modern penology and prison administration strongly
counsel against such a view."15
Under the subjective test, Justice Frankfurter's ideal is not attained:
One of the most serious shortcomings of the present entrapment
law is that the predisposition element tends to encourage or tempt
law enforcement officers into a "devil-may-care" or "anything
goes" attitude toward persons of a known criminal reputation."1 6
Officers can easily direct inducements at a person with a record of prior
criminal activity. Then, if the past offender succumbs, the officers can
point to his criminal record as evidence of predisposition. Most juries
would probably regard such evidence as conclusive that defendant was
108. Grossman v. State, 457 P.2d 226, 229 (Alas. 1969).
109. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 382 (1958) (concurring opinion).
110. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
111. Id. at 375. One federal case held that an officer's testimony that the
defendant sold him narcotics while riding in the officer's car some nine months
prior to the offense charged "was so prejudicial to the accused . . . as to out-
weigh [its] probative value . . . on the issue of predisposition." Hansford v.
United States, 303 F.2d 219, 226 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
112. 356 U.S. at 372.
113. MODEL. PENAL CODE § 2.10, Comment (rent. Draft No. 9, 1959).
114. Comment, The Assertion of Inconsistent Defenses in Entrapment Cases,
56 IowA L. REv. 686, 694 (1971).
115. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 383 (concurring opinion).
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"predisposed" to commit such an offense. It is difficult to conceive a
situation in which an habitual criminal could successfully raise entrap-
ment as a defense, when prosecuted for commission of his specialty.117
Although the evidence of prior criminal activity is not conclusive on the
predisposition issue and the particular police activity calls for acquittal
of a nonpredisposed defendant, the practical effect of admitting such
evidence will usually be conviction. On this basis, a plausible argument
can be made that the subjective test denies equal protection of the law
to defendants with police records.11 8
Adoption of an objective test for entrapment would alleviate this
basic unfairness. Because this test focuses on the police activity in ques-
tion, all individuals brought before a court have an equal opportunity
to challenge unfair official conduct. The possibility is eliminated that
official overreaching can be ignored solely because the defendant's record
justifies a finding of predisposition.
VIII. REASONABLE SUSPICION
Some courts impose an additional requirement closely related to the
predisposition issue:11 9 Before officers may engage in conduct directed
at soliciting commission of an offense, they must have "reasonable grounds
to believe that [the defendant] is engaged in unlawful activities or intends
to engage therein."' 20 Although this requirement is usually referred to
as "reasonable suspicion,"' 21 the term is not dearly defined. Further, "the
application of this additional test has been haphazard, irregular, and con-
tradictory." 22 At a minimum, one court allowed reasonable suspicion to
be inferred from the mere fact that the officer engaged in conduct designed
to produce criminal activity by the defendant.' 2 3 In essence, this is not
a reasonable suspicion requirement at all. One court described the test
as probable cause, but did not clarify whether this meant probable cause
to arrest or to search, or some independent probable cause standard.' 24
Other cases have not required reasonable suspicion with respect to merely
"offering the opportunity to commit crime."'12 5
117. Id. at 306.
118. Cf. Orfield, supra note 76, at 56 n.103.
119. See e.g., Whiting v. United States, 321 F.2d 72, 77 (1st Cir.), cert. denied,
375 U.S. 884 (1963).
120. Lunsford v. United States, 200 F.2d 237, 289 (10th Cir. 1952). The court
in Lunsford indicated that evidence of "reasonable grounds" could replace evi-
dence of predisposition and, thus, negate any police overreaching. The dangers
of such a position are obvious. "Reasonable grounds" are often derived from
the defendant's past record and hearsay statements by other persons (e.g., de-
fendant's neighbors), Cf. Hill v. United States, 328 F.2d 988 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 851 (1964). Such a rule fails to restrict the sort of inducements that police
may offer where the object has a past record and suspicious minded neighbors.
121. See Weathers v. United States, 126 F.2d 118 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 316
U.S. 681 (1942).
122. WorING PAPERS OF THE NATIONAL COMuMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL
CRIMINAL LAWS 322 (1970) [hereinafter cited as WORKING PAPD.s].
123. People v. Benford, 53 Cal. 2d 1, 845 P.2d 928 (1959).
124. Whiting v. United States, 321 F.2d 72, 77 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 884 (1963).
125. United States v. DeVore, 423 F.2d 1069, 1071 (4th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 950 (1971).
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Although in 1969 one writer observed that the Missouri cases have
not expressed a reasonable suspicion requirement, 26 this assessment may
be partially incorrect. In State v. Taylor127 the court stated: "From the
evidence of entrapment favorable to defendant the jury could have found
that the narcotics agent did not have reasonable cause to suspect that
defendant was an actual or potential violator of the narcotics laws .... ,,128
Further, the instruction approved in State v. Hammond'20 gave as an exam-
ple of "lawful entrapment":
When ... the Government has reasonable grounds for believing
that person is engaged in the illicit sale of narcotics, it is not
unlawful entrapment for a Government agent to pretend to be
someone else and to offer, either directly or through an informer
or other decoy, to purchase narcotics from such suspected person.8 0
Finally, in the 1971 case, State v. Stock,' 13 the Missouri Supreme Court
stated the general rule on determination of entrapment as a matter of law:
[W]here an informer or undercover agent has been given money
by the police and instructed to make a "buy" of narcotics from a
person whom the officer had reason to believe was engaging in
such activity, the defense of unlawful entrapment is not available;
at least such facts do not constitute entrapment as a matter of
law.'3 2
These cases do not clarify whether Missouri has a reasonable suspicion
requirement. 33 The Draft Missouri Pattern Criminal Instructions contain
126. DRAFT Mo. PATTERN Cam. INsTR., Comment on Entrapment (1969).
127. 375 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1964).
128. Id. at 61 (emphasis added).
129. 447 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. 1969); see note 52 supra.
130. 447 S.W.2d at 255 (emphasis added).
131. 463 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. 1971).
132. Id. at 892 (emphasis added).
133. In the most recent Missouri case dealing with entrapment, State v. Van
Regenmorter, 465 S.W.2d 613 (Mo. 1971), the defendant argued on appeal that
a "reasonable suspicion" or "reasonable grounds" requirement exists in Mis-
souri, based on the quote from Hammond accompanying note 130 supra. How-
ever, the court sidestepped the issue. Brief for Appellant at 7-8, State v. Van
Regenmorter, 465 S.W.2d 613 (Mo. 1971). The case involved a soldier stationed
at Ft. Leonard Wood, Missouri. At the request of an undercover narcotics agent,
the soldier left the base with marijuana in his possession in order to make a
sale at a nearby truck stop. The defendant argued that the agent had induced
him to commit a crime against the State of Missouri, pointing out that he had
already committed an offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, by
possessing the marijuana on the base. The defendant implied that the agent
had lured him into the jurisdiction of the state courts in order to make available
a higher maximum sentence. Id. at 8-9. The court said that because the charge
was possession of marijuana and no basis existed for contending that the agents
brought about defendants initial possession, "classical entrapment [was]
not . . . involved and the question of reasonable suspicion [was] not material."
465 S.W.2d at 617.
In raising entrapment, the defendant in Van Regenmorter relied on Carbajal-
Portillo v. United States, 396 F.2d 944 (9th Cir. 1968), where the court found
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no provision on this point. 3 4 Further, neither the Model Penal Code'3 5
nor the Proposed New Federal Criminal Code' 36 provides for such a re-
quirement. However, a comment to the Proposed Federal Code points
out the possibility of adding a reasonable suspicion requirement as a
supplementary standard for the conduct of law enforcement officers.137
Any version of the reasonable suspicion requirement endangers the
defendant with undue prejudice in jurisdictions that follow the subjective
test and submit the entrapment issue to the jury. 38 Evidence on the
reasonable suspicion question will undoubtedly include hearsay respecting
defendant's prior activities.1 39 Thus, the danger arises that the jury will
misuse such evidence. However, this danger can be mitigated by leaving
the determination of reasonable suspicion to the judge, as when evidence
is challenged on illegal search and seizure grounds.
Regardless of the test for entrapment followed by a particular juris-
diction, a reasonable suspicion requirement helps assure that police will
only seek to induce criminal acts when they have a good basis to believe
that the object of their solicitations will respond.' 40 However, if adopted,
the nature of the requirement should be clarified. Further, either decision
or statute should outline the results flowing from the presence or absence
of reasonable suspicion. A stringent rule foreclosing all solicitation (even
mere presentation of opportunity) absent reasonable suspicion could be
adopted. Or, the requirement could be made inapplicable unless the
police activity warrants an instruction on entrapment. In the latter
instance in a subjective test jurisdiction, the law could be formulated
so that a finding of police overreaching requires acquittal, unless predis-
position and reasonable suspicion are also found. Query: whether a prior
criminal record should constitute reasonable grounds?
into the United States, in order to arrest and prosecute him for smuggling nar-
cotics. The defendant was only hired to carry a quantity of heroin to the border.
Carbajal acknowledgedly displayed a reluctance to bring narcotics into
this Country. . . . So long as that reluctance endured without being
overcome, Carbajal would not be engaging in the illicit narcotics traffic
that our laws are designed to prevent.... [Hjere the agent affirmatively
persuaded Carbajal to commit the crime in order that he might arrest him.
Id. at 947.
However, the Missouri court said that the facts of Van Regenmorter were closer
to those of United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007 (2d Cir. 1933), and United States
v. Edwards, 366 F.2d 853 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 908 (1967), in
which the court refused to find entrapment because the defendants were willing
to travel from one jurisdiction to another with contraband in their possession
to make interstate sales when presented with the opportunity. State v. Van Regen-
morter, supra at 616-17 (Mo. 1971).
134. See DRAPr Mo. PATrEm CRm. INsTR. Nos. 3.28 & 3.30 (1969).
135. See note 29 supra.
136. Id.
137. PROIOsEO NEw Fm. Ciutm. CoDE § 702, Comment (1971)..
138. The Missouri cases indicate that if reasonable suspicion is required, its
existence is a jury question. See text accompanying note 128 supra.
139. See note 120 supra.
140. A reasonable suspicion requirement serves primarily as a protection against
civilian informers working for the government. In contrast to the police, civilian
informers are more likely to select the objects of their inducements at random.
WoRmNG PAPERs, supra note 122, at 323.
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IX. TRIAL OF THE ISSUE
A. Entrapment as a Matter of Law
Where defendant's evidence indicates that official overreaching in-
duced the crime in question, the issue of entrapment normally is sub-
mitted to the jury. This rule prevails in both the Missouri and federal
courts.1 41 However, under some circumstances, the court may find en-
trapment as a matter of law.142 There is apparently no "magic word" test
for determining when a court will find entrapment as a matter of law.
In Sherman v. United States143 an informant testified that he had to engage
in repeated requests before defendant would supply him with narcotics
and that defendant resisted these entreaties for quite some time. The
defendant was trying to overcome his drug addiction at the time. Further,
two narcotics convictions (the most recent being five years old) con-
stituted the only evidence of predisposition. The United States Supreme
Court held that, in combination, these facts indicated entrapment as a
matter of law. Thus, the issue should not have been submitted to the
jury. Carbajal-Portillo v. United States'44 also presented a situation where
the testimony of the alleged entrapper indicated the defendant's reluctance
to commit the offense charged, coupled with entrapping tactics that
amounted to deceitful inducement. The court held this to be entrapment
as a matter of law.145 A few cases have held that entrapment is a jury
question, unless "as a matter of law the defendant has established beyond
a reasonable doubt that he was entrapped". 146 However, this language is
only additional verbiage indicating the same process involved in Sherman
and Carbajal-Portillo. As the court in Washington v. United States147 said,
the determination whether entrapment has been established as a matter
of law involves balancing the predisposition of the accused against the
conduct of the government agents.' 48 In some cases the police activity
will be so unfair under the totality of the circumstances that a court will
refuse to allow a conviction based on such conduct to stand. Such cases
only arise where the prosecution's evidence reveals inducement or at least
fails to controvert this fact. A court will not find entrapment as a matter
of law solely from evidence presented by the defendant, if the prosecu-
tion's evidence shows different circumstances. 49
141. Masciale v. United States, 356 U.S. 386 (1958); Sherman v. United
States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Rogers v. United States, 367 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 943 (1967); State v. Taylor, 375 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1964).
142. See, e.g., Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369 (1958); Carbajal-Portillo
v. United States, 396 F.2d 944 (9th Cir. 1968); United States v. Klosterman, 248
F.2d 191 (3rd Cir. 1957).
143. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
144. 396 F.2d 944 (9th Cir. 1968).
145. Id. at 946.
146. E.g., Washington v. United States, 275 F.2d 687, 689 (5th Cir. 1960);
Accardi v. United States, 257 F.2d 168, 171 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 358 U.S. 883(1958).147. 275 F.2d 687 (5th Cir. 1960).
148. Id. at 689.
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B. Should Entrapment Be a Jury Question?
Because unduly prejudicial evidence can be admitted to show predispo-
sition under the subjective test, some writers do not agree with the general
view that entrapment should be a jury question.'S 0 However, argument
for court determination of the issue initially occurred in conjunction
with advocacy for the objective test, where the danger of undue prejudice
did not enter consideration. For example, Justice Roberts, concurring
in Sorrells v. United States,151 urged adoption of an objective test and set
out policy considerations for placing the determination in the hands of
the judge:
The protection of its own functions and the preservation of the
purity of its own temple belongs only to the court. It is the
province of the court and of the court alone to protect itself and
the government from such prostitution of the criminal law.' 52
Justice Frankfurter later added to this statement by pointing out that a
jury determination "cannot give significant guidance for official conduct
for the future," but a court, through the development of precedents and
explicit standards, "can do this with the degree of certainty that the wise
administration of criminal justice demands."' 53 Although the Model Penal
Code' 54 provides for court determination of the entrapment issue, another
objective formulation, the Proposed New Federal Criminal Code,'55
mainly contemplates jury consideration. Nevertheless, the comments to
the Proposed Federal Code include this proposal:
[S]ince the propriety of the prosecution depends upon the pro-
priety of the law enforcement techniques, the defense could be
stated as a bar to prosecution. This would have the effect of remov-
ing the issue from jury consideration, even though the court, in
order to avoid the duplication of effort, may defer hearing evidence
on the issue until trial. 56
Persuasive arguments exist on both sides of the issue whether entrap-
ment should be a jury question in an objective test jurisdiction. On the
one hand, Justices Roberts and Frankfurter argued that a court should
have power to determine whether its processes would be corrupted by
allowing conviction based on the police conduct in question.15 ' Juries
150. See text accompanying notes 108-17 supra.
151. 287 U.S. 435 (1932).
152. Id. at 457 (concurring opinion).
153. Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 385 (1958) (concurring opinion).
154. See note 29 supra.
155. Id.
156. PRoPosED Nrnw FED. CaRn. CoDE § 702, Comment (1971).
157. The "corruption" rationale for the defense of entrapment should be
compared with the "imperative of judicial integrity" rationale that has appeared
in United States Supreme Court decisions in connection with excluding the fruits
of unlawful searches and seizures. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Elkins
v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960). One writer stated: "[T]he Court has im-
pliedly rejected the theory of 'judicial integrity' and identified the exclusionary
rule's primary purpose as that of controlling police behavior." Oaks, Studying the
Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. Ci. L. REv. 665, 670-71 (1970).
Deterring police activity that would lead an otherwise law-abiding citizen into
crime is a better rationale for the entrapment defense than that of preventing
corruption of the judicial processes.
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are not likely to understand or respect the rights of an accused and "are
apt to give great latitude to the police at least in relation to an otherwise
guilty defendant."' 5 8 Further, as Justice Frankfurter observed, court de-
terminations may provide desirable consistency that will aid enforcement
agencies in developing workable standards. On the other hand, under
an objective test "an alleged entrapment presents a question of evaluating
police behavior and determining whether it might have created too great
a temptation for the ordinary law-abiding citizen."'159 This "judgment
about the motivations of ordinary people" probably falls within the special
competence of the jury.160
C. Raising the Defense
The defense of entrapment may be raised under a general plea of
not guilty.161 No jurisdiction requires special pleading of the defense.162
Indeed, under Justice Roberts's theory the defense should be raised on
the court's own motion in conjunction with the power to prevent corrup-
tion of the judicial processes, "no matter by whom or at what stage of
the proceedings the facts are brought to its attention."' 63
In Missouri a trial court must instruct on entrapment if evidence in
the case presents the issue, irrespective of the defendant's failure to make
such a request.164 However, this rule does not go as far as that advocated
by Justice Roberts. In Missouri a defendant may not challenge on appeal
the failure to instruct on entrapment, if this point was not properly pre-
served in his motion for a new trial. 65
D. Burden of Proof
Currently, in Missouri a jury to which the entrapment issue is sub-
mitted must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not
entrapped in order to convict.16 6 Draft Missouri Pattern Criminal In-
158. MoDEL PENAL CODE § 2.10, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). Cf.
Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 568, 3 (1964), where Mr. Justice Jackson observed with
regard to jury determination of the voluntariness of confessions: There is a
"danger that matters pertaining to the defendant's guilt will infect the jury's
findings of fact bearing upon voluntariness, as well as its conclusion upon that
issue if.... " This observation is equally true of jury determination of entrap-
ment, no matter which test a jurisdiction follows.159. MODEU PENAL CoDE § 2.10, Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959).160. Id.
161. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 485 (1982); Rogers v. United States,567 F.2d 998 (8th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, =86 U.S. 948 (1967).162. WoIG P.A, ERS, supra note 122, at 826.165. Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S. 485, 457 (1982) (concurring opinion).
164. State v. Decker, 821 Mo. 1168, 14 S.W.2d 617 (1929); accord, State v.Hicks, 826 Mo. 1056, 88 S.W.2d 928 (1980). § 4025, RSMo 1919 [now § 546.070,RSMo 1969], in force at the time of these decisions, reads in part:
[F]ourth, whether requested or not, the court must instruct the juryin writing upon all questions of law arising in the case which are neces-
sary for their information in giving their verdict; which instructions shallinclude, whenever necessary, the subjects of good character and reasonabledoubt; and a failure to so instruct in cases of felony shall be good cause,when the defendant is found guilty, for setting aside the verdict of the
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struction Number 3.28167 maintains this position. However, the alternate
draft instruction, to be submitted at the defendant's request, calls for
acquittal if the jury should "find and believe from the evidence" that
the defendant was not ready and willing to engage in the conduct but
did so only because of official inducement.168 The Model Penal Code,
having adopted an objective test, requires a defendant seeking acquittal
to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that entrapment induced
his criminal conduct.169 The Proposed New Federal Criminal Code, which
also follows the objective rule, calls entrapment an "affirmative defense."'17 0
Thus, the defendant must establish entrapment by a preponderance of
the evidence, 17 1 as under the Model Penal Code. Because the objective
test is not concerned with the defendant's conduct or predisposition, the
two immediately preceding formulations do not place any burden on
the defendant with regard to his own actions. Instead, they require a
defendant seeking acquittal on entrapment grounds to show by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the officer or informer's conduct falls
within the proscription.'7 2
X. DENYING THE CRIME BUT RAISING THE DEFENSE: INCONSISTENCY?
Because the entrapment doctrine is based on the assumption "that
the act charged was committed,"' 7 3 a number of cases have held that a
defendant may not both deny committing the act that constitutes the
offense charged and raise the defense. 74 This position is based on the
reasoning that a subjective test for entrapment focuses on determining
whether the conduct of the officers or the defendant's turn of mind caused
commission of the crime; there could be little logic to such an inquiry
if defendant denies committing the offense.175
Two older Missouri cases' 7 6 discussed the entrapment issue, despite
the fact that defendant also denied committing the act, without mention-
ing the possible inconsistency. However, the more recent cases adhere
to the general view that the defendant may not both deny the act and
167. DRAr Mo. PATrrauN CvuM. INsTm No. 3.28 (1969); see instruction quoted
note 56 supra.
168. DRArr Mo. PATERN Cmir. INsTR. No. 3.30 (1969); see instruction quoted
note 56 supra.
169. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.13 (2) (Proposed Official Draft, 1962).
170. PROPosED NEw FED. Carm. CoDE § 702 (1) (1971).
171. Id., Comment.
172. See Note, Entrapment, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1333, 134445 (1960), for a dis-
cussion of the constitutionality of placing a burden of proof on the defendant
with regard to the entrapment issue. The final draft of one criminal code re-
vision project requires only that the defendant inject the issue of entrapment into
the case; the burden of proving that the defendant was not entrapped then falls
on the prosecution. MICH. REv. CRM. CODE §§ 640, 645 (Final Draft, 1967).
173. State v. Taylor, 375 S.W.2d 58, 62 (Mo. 1964).
174. E.g., United States v. Johnston, 426 F.2d 112 (7th Cir. 1970); Chisum
v. United States, 421 F.2d 207 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Roviaro, 379 F.2d
911 (7th Cir. 1967); Marko v. United States, 314 F.2d 595 (5th Cir. 1963).
175. See Ortega v. United States, 348 F.2d 874, 876 (9th Cir. 1965); Ramirez
v. United States, 294 F.2d 277 (9th Cir. 1961).
176. State v. Decker, 321 Mo. 1163, 14 S.W.2d 617 (1929); State v. Murphy,
320 Mo. 219, 6 S.W.2d 877 (1928).
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defend on entrapment grounds.177 Of more importance, the Missouri
Supreme Court has recognized an exception to this general view. This
exception was first acknowledged by a federal court in the 1956 case of
Henderson v. United States.1 78 In that case the trial court refused to in-
struct on entrapment, because the defendant denied involvement in the
charged offense, conspiracy to violate the liquor laws. On appeal, the court
approved this ruling to a certain extent:
[T]he fact that Henderson had committed illegal acts which
furthered the object of the conspiracy did not constitute him a
conspirator unless he did so with some knowledge of the con-
spiracy, and, hence . . . Henderson, denying that he was a party
to or knew of the conspiracy, could not with entire consistency
claim that he was entrapped into committing that offense.179
However, the appellate court went on to state that the entrapment doctrine
might have broader application than merely as a defense to the specific
crime charged:
[T]he defendant could admit operating the illicit still, deny being
a party to the conspiracy charged, and still defend on the ground
that such overt acts as he did commit were done as a result of
entrapment; he could say "I did not go so far as to become a party
to the conspiracy, but to the extent that I did travel down the
road to crime, I was entrapped." The two defenses do not seem to
us so repugnant that proof of the one necessarily disproves the
other.180
In a 1964 case, State v. Taylor,'8 1 the Missouri Supreme Court relied prin-
cipally on Henderson to hold that under the circumstances, the defendant
could both deny selling narcotics and raise the defense of entrapment.1 82
Ample evidence in the case indicated overreaching by an undercover
narcotics agent.'88 The court stated, in regard to both denying the offense
and raising entrapment:
[A]dmitting that he was there; that he searched for and found
a source of marijuana and a willing seller, arranged for a sale and
was present when the narcotics were transferred, defendant argues
that in legal contemplation his acts did not, technically, constitute
a "sale" or joint action with the seller, but that if he is wrong as
to the legal effect of what he did, he nevertheless should be ex-
onerated on the ground of entrapment. Under these circumstances
both defenses are available.1 8 4
177. E.g., State v. Stock, 463 S.W.2d 889 (Mo. 1971) (dictum); State v. Taylor,
375 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1964); State v. Varnon, 174 S.W.2d 146 (Mo. 1943); State
v. Egan, 272 S.W.2d 719 (Spr. Mo. App. 1954).
178. 237 F.2d 169 (5th Cir. 1956).
179. Id. at 171.
180. Id. at 173.
181. 375 S.W.2d 58 (Mo. 1964).
182. Id. at 62.
183. See text accompanying note 83 supra.
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These cases appear to hold that both denial and entrapment are available
where there is no factual issue whether defendant committed certain acts,
but there is a question as to the legal effect of these acts.
Some courts recognize a different exception. Although a defendant
may not normally both deny committing the offense and raise entrapment,
this rule does not apply where the prosecution's evidence indicated that
even if defendant committed the crime, he did so only in response to
entrapment.18 5
The general rule has been criticized: "[E]ven if entrapment and
[denial of commission of the offense] are inconsistent, still the demands
of justice in a criminal case are such that both should be allowed as
alternative defenses."' 81 It is unfair to protect the police from censure
and deprive the defendant of a defense, merely because he has decided as
a matter of strategy to make the prosecution prove the offense beyond
a reasonable doubt.'87 Moreover, one writer has argued that the rule
against alternative defenses is unconstitutional. 88 In order to assert the
defense of entrapment, the defendant might be forced to forego his con-
stitutional rights to have the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt
and not to be a witness against himself.'89 This writer draws analogy to
Simmons v. United States,190 where the Supreme Court held that the de-
fendant's testimony at a pretrial hearing in order to establish his standing
to challenge the admissibility of evidence on fourth amendment grounds
could not be used as direct evidence at trial. The Court commented that
a defendant cannot be forced to forfeit his right against self-incrimination
in order to assert the constitutional right to freedom from illegal search
and seizure.' 1 Even if the defense otherwise foregone is not constitutionally
based, application of the Simmons rationale should not be precluded'92
where this defense is important to the defendant's case.
On balance, it is better to give a criminal defendant the opportunity
to defend by both denying commission of the offense and pleading en-
trapment. A defendant probably will not hesitate to raise the defense
where the prosecution's own evidence shows entrapment. 93 However,
as a practical matter, the defendant probably will not want to present
the finder of fact with two obviously incongruous theories of his own.
Although this position allows a defendant to plead the alternative defenses
of entrapment and denial, the principle should not be extended to give
185. Sears v. United States, 343 F.2d 139 (5th Cir. 1965); Hansford v. United
States, 303 F.2d 219 (D.C. Cir. 1962). In United States v. Pickle, 424 F.2d 528
(5th Cir. 1970), the court incorrectly stated that Sears held substantially the same
as Henderson v. United States. See text accompanying notes 178-80 supra. The
facts recited in the Pickle opinion are insufficient to indicate what effect this had
on the defendant's case.
186. WoRYUG PAPERS, supra note 122, at 326.
187. Id. See generally Orfield, The Defense of Entrapment in the Federal
Courts, 1967 Dux L.J. 39, 66 n.166.
188. Comment, The Assertion of Inconsistent Defenses in Entrapment Cases,
56 IowA L. REv. 686, 689-90 (1971).
189. Id. at 690.
190. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
191. See id. at 394.
192. Comment, supra note 188, at 691.
193. See text accompanying note 185 supra.
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him a license to commit perjury or an immunity from impeachment by
his prior inconsistent statements.
XI. CONCLUSION
Assuming that a given jurisdiction recognizes the defense of entrap-
ment, is the subjective test or the objective test preferable? Although
pointed criticisms have been leveled at the subjective test (e.g., the danger
of undue prejudice,194 and the difficulty in formulating workable jury
instructions'95), its proponents also make persuasive arguments. Presented
with the opportunity in Sherman v. United States, 96 the Supreme Court
refused to adopt the objective test, saying that the prosecution would be
unduly handicapped if not allowed to show that defendant's readiness
rather than police overreaching caused commission of the offense.'9 7 The
argument can be made that the police should be allowed to engage in
inducement whenever they have good reason to believe that a certain person
is engaged in criminal activity and afterwards can demonstrate the basis
for this belief and a continuing source of unlawful conduct. Because a
person engaged in such activity is naturally wary and fearful of detection,
a great deal of persuasion and reassurance might be required before he
will commit the offense.
On balance, however, the objective test more effectively deters un-
desirable police tactics and at the same time is easier to apply.198 Of equal
importance, under the objective test those with criminal records are not
as vulnerable to police inducements that would call for acquittal of an
ordinary citizen.' 99 If the police activity was such that it would probably
cause a normally law-abiding person to commit the offense, any defendant
could gain acquittal.
If a jurisdiction decides to follow the objective test, adoption by a
statute based on the language of the Model Penal Code200 or the Proposed
New Federal Criminal Code 201 is preferable to judicial decision.20 2 How-
ever, it can be argued that because the defense was judicially created, any
changes should be left to the courts. Nevertheless, the substantial public
policy questions involved dictate that such determinations should be made
by the elected representatives of the people. For example, a statute can
dearly spell out whether reasonable suspicion is required, what this re-
quirement entails and whether this question is determined by the court
or the jury. Irrespective of how the statute handles these collateral matters,
adoption of an objective test would alleviate much of the confusion and
unfairness in this currently muddled area of the criminal law.
REm CARRON
194. See pt. VI of this comment.
195. See text accompanying notes 99-104 supra.
196. 356 U.S. 369 (1958).
197. Id. at 376-77.
198. See text accompanying note 104 supra.
199. See pt. VI of this comment.
200. See note 29 supra.
201. Id.
202. Draftsmen of a statute on entrapment should consider modifying either
of these proposed codes to follow the Michigan revision committee's view on the
burden of proof. See note 172 supra.
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